#### General Information:

Date of this Plan / Latest Update	November 1, 2016
Locations Currently Occupied by Department	Roadway airport access points, airport controlled parking, drop off and loading areas outside Terminal, Terminal area, Security Screening, Concourses A and B and associated ramp areas, AGT Tunnel, Tenant Hangars and surrounding ramp areas, DHL and FedEx Cargo Operations and surrounding ramp areas
Assigned Alternative Locations	Given the various points of failure, there are several different scenarios and therefore several different assigned locations-all are discussed in this plan
Process Owner / Company Officer	Brian Cobb / Tim Zeis
Location Incident Operations Team Representative(s)	Stephen Saunders / Wendi Orlando / Brian Cobb
Incident Response Team Member(s)	To Be Determined by Location Incident Operations Team Representative

### **Principal Processes**

The operations, locations and facilities covered by this continuity plan include passenger activities using the roadway airport access points, airport controlled parking, drop off and loading areas outside the Terminal, Terminal area, Security Screening, Concourses A and B and associated ramp areas, and AGT Tunnel. The plan also discusses aspects of the Tenant Hangars and surrounding ramp areas, as well as DHL and FedEx Cargo Operations and the associated surrounding ramp areas.

- The Terminal functions provide passenger check-in positions for all airlines and related baggage check-in and retrieval operations on multiple levels.
- The Security Screening building functions provide passenger screening under all TSA requirements.
- Concourse A functions involve gate operations for passenger airlines except for Delta Airlines.
- Concourse B functions involve gate operations for Delta Airlines and all scheduled international arrivals (with exception to those flights operating as "Pre-Cleared" by US Customs and Border Protection).

Each airline is responsible for providing personnel, services and equipment to enable their flights to operate in the event of an incident. KCAB has no direct responsibility for airline contingency plans for their individual operations, although there will obviously be a need for contingency plan and activity coordination with KCAB with regard to providing physical access, usable facilities, passenger movement, utility services, and certain basic passenger comfort services at the airport like HVAC and restrooms. The Transportation Security Administration and

US Customs and Border Protection are responsible for maintaining a business continuity plan for their passenger screening, security, and customs operations, but these plans are not shared with KCAB. Lack of these government operations would compromise the ability to provide air service, so it is vital they also have a contingency plan in place. It is assumed a significant amount of facility coordination will also be required from KCAB in the event of facility relocation of these government operations. Likely departments with significant involvement would include Planning and Development, Facilities Maintenance, IT, Police, Airport Security, and ARFF.

These customer-facing facilities provide the initial perception of the airport, as well as the basic ability for a passenger to fly from or to the airport. The Customer Service function, overseen by the Vice President-Customer Service, is the Airport liaison for these functions. A CVG Terminal Operations Manual documents the framework of operations between airlines and the Airport and is located at <a href="https://extranet.cvgairport.com/sites/kcabcs/">https://extranet.cvgairport.com/sites/kcabcs/</a>. The manual also discusses a number of specific airport operational procedures, including certain related contingency plans.

Inability to provide flight operations at the airport could involve contractual penalty, increased FAA scrutiny and fines, but most importantly, a direct 'hit' on the airport's reputation with the public, financial consequences, and concern among airlines of the airport's abilities as a business partner.

The Airport serves the direct facility needs of the airlines, which then provide service to their customers as part of the collective travel experience. These collective services (along with US government participation in security and customs requirements) include the following activities, referred to as the passenger travel ribbon. The following operations, in no specific order, are part of that experience:

Roadway access points	Airport controlled     Parking	<ul> <li>Airport contracted transportation to/from parking facilities</li> </ul>
Skycaps	<ul> <li>Traveler Security (TSA)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Food, beverage, retail operations</li> </ul>
Ticketing, check in and reservation services	<ul> <li>Train to/from Concourses</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Aircraft deicing/storm water treatment</li> </ul>
Baggage services	<ul> <li>Escalators. Elevators, and Powerwalks</li> </ul>	Runway operations
Signage/Wayfinding	Gate Holdrooms	<ul> <li>Ramp operations, ground service equipment</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Multi-User Flight Information Display Systems (MUFIDS), inclusive of primary and secondary gate displays</li> </ul>	WIFI/Cable TV	<ul> <li>Aircraft passenger loading bridges and associated potable water, ground power, and conditioned air connections</li> </ul>
Airline fueling (hydrant system and service vehicles)	<ul> <li>US Customs and Border Protection and Department of Agriculture</li> </ul>	Distributed Antenna System (DAS)
<ul> <li>Security controlled airport badged employee access</li> </ul>	Restrooms	<ul> <li>Interfaith Meditation and Military Lounges</li> </ul>

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The above discussion relates primarily to the movement of passengers by the airlines. KCAB also is home to the North American cargo hub operation for DHL. The DHL operations all occur in a separate part of the airport, on the south airfield area in several buildings, including a main sorting facility. DHL is responsible for providing all of their own personnel, systems, sorting and loading equipment, warehousing capability, maintenance, customs and inspection work, deicing equipment and services, ramp services, and interfaces with government agencies.

KCAB's responsibilities are generally to provide a safe, operating airfield, road access to the buildings, and elements of overall physical security like perimeter fencing and exterior security cameras, and environmental treatment of deicing material/storm water runoff. KCAB provides water and sewer service to DHL, and that is covered in KCAB's infrastructure contingency plan. Environmental services provided by KCAB are discussed in a separate Business Continuity Plan. DHL directly contracts with Duke Energy for electric and gas service, and KCAB has no involvement with those activities. DHL would therefore be largely responsible for their own business continuity plan relative to their business operations.

Similar to DHL's independent operations, there are smaller organizations on the airfield. operating with their own staff and/or contract personnel under the same conditions as outlined above (e.g. Fixed Based Operator, FedEx, and Maintenance Hangars Tenants). As with the larger operators, they will be expected to have their individual contingency plan to maintain business continuity.

The contingency plans discussed in this document all deal with passenger processing associated with the Terminal, Concourses, and support locations. The plan does not address actual airfield operations. A separate document discusses the FAA tower and their contingency operations, and another discusses the fuel farm and fuel distribution. Field Maintenance, ARFF, Police, and Safety, Security and Compliance Business Continuity Plans all are involved in additional aspects of runway operations. Since the airport operates 4 runways, as long as at least some of those runways are fully and safely operational, they should not be a limiting factor to ongoing air operations.

#### **Critical KCAB Systems, Applications or Equipment**

- General IT Network Infrastructure, LAN, and Distributed Antenna System
- Multi-User Flight Information Displays (MUFIDs) Equipment and Audio Paging System
- Passenger conveyance
  - elevators, escalators and moving walkways
  - AGT Train
- Passenger loading bridges
- Public restrooms
- Baggage handling system
- Honeywell life safety systems
- Everbridge (Airport Communications Center Mass Notification)
- Aviation Fuel Hydrant System
- EMP Lightning Suppression
- Infor
- CVG Extranet for communication with airlines, tenants, etc. https://extranet.cvgairport.com/sites/kcabcs/.

Note: In addition to these KCAB infrastructure systems or equipment items, specific airline contingency plans consider ensuring an appropriate number of available personnel (either employees or contractors), supplies and equipment for performing activities like passenger check-in operations, ramp services, baggage services, fueling services, deicing services, etc. are available. With the exception of ownership for the baggage handling system, KCAB does not provide any of these services.

Note: The airlines are also responsible for contract fueling their planes through the fuel farm operation - see the separate fuel farm continuity memo.

The KCAB LAN (local area network) provides passive infrastructure cabling via local area network access points at gate areas, ticket counters, and operational areas and airline shared space. Essentially KCAB is providing a network for the plug-in connection of airline-provided information system equipment for reservations, check-in, and similar customer-facing activities. The airlines are responsible for the repair or replacement of their passenger processing equipment that may be affected in a business continuity situation. Additionally, KCAB has no responsibility for any of the airline software used to operate those systems. The Facilities Maintenance and Information Technology Business Continuity Plans discuss alternatives for loss of fiber network, as well as KCAB systems or functions such as MUFIDS or Paging capabilities.

The principal use of the Honeywell system for terminal operations is for monitoring fire suppression, fire alarms, lighting, and HVAC management throughout the Airport, including these specific facilities. Honeywell and related contingency plans are discussed in the Facilities Maintenance and ARFF Business Continuity Plan.

Multi-User Flight Information Display System (MUFIDS) and related display terminals provide passenger information regarding flight status, arriving and departing flight gates, planes and times, visual paging, and baggage claim information.

The AGT Train connects the Terminal, Concourse A and Concourse B. There are two trains; the trains are owned by KCAB, and maintenance is provided by Delta Airlines through a contractor.

Audio Paging provides audio announcements to passengers and general announcements throughout these areas.

Everbridge is a contracted software to support the Airport Communication Center's mass notification to identified airport stakeholders.

The baggage handling system serves all scheduled airlines and is owned by KCAB. Regular maintenance on the system is currently provided under contract with Delta Airlines through its maintenance vendor.

Infor is a system used by the centralized dispatch/Airport Communications Center (extension 7777) to log serviceable issues around the airport.

EMP is a lightning suppression technology owned and maintained by KCAB. The technology supports continued airline operations around the Concourses, under defined limitations, during lightning events.

### Items to Consider Relative to this Department's Business Continuity Plan

This plan discusses the contingency operations if damage occurs to various different aspects of the Terminal or Concourse operations. In the event of a catastrophic event in which the entire Terminal or Concourse area is destroyed or severely damaged, a specific detailed plan considering these events would need to be updated depending upon the actual event and extent of damage and remaining facilities. Elements of the following plans can be used in the event of significant damage to facilities. As of plan publication, Concourse A serves all airlines except Delta; KCAB will likely have more responsibility for those recovery and contingency plans than in Concourse B due to the current maintenance oversight terms and responsibilities. Concourse B serves only Delta and international arrivals; Delta would be expected to provide most of the passenger processing contingency planning if only Concourse B was inoperable.

For any future alternative site, equipment and fixtures for airline and passenger use, starting with customer arrival and terminating with airplane loading and departure, would need to be placed in each to reestablish customer operations. Significant facility cleaning or temporary construction could be needed, loading bridge or alternatives like passenger boarding stairs capabilities established, and the TSA would need to re-establish security screening capabilities and test them prior to any reactivation. There would likely be needs for immediate barrier/restricted area construction to allow for alternative passenger traffic flow. This could require an extended period of time before any of these actions could be completed.

Another consideration is that each airline likely has their own contingency plan in case the airport is unavailable to provide capacity for their normal level of operations. This condition is considered to be scalable dependent upon the reduced operating conditions of the airport, as facilitated by KCAB among operators, and the capabilities of the nearest available airport(s) to support increased operations. The Airport must consider the need to ensure, to the extent provided for in airline agreements, that airlines are treated equitably. As a result, in a disaster situation the Airport may require all carriers to ratably reduce their number of flights, so each airline is treated fairly.

Additionally, it is believed by the Vice President - Customer Service that most airline contingency planning for any specific airport would be contingent upon access to their proprietary computer reservation systems, and not necessarily to related physical facilities or capability to operate at the airport. In this situation, it is anticipated the airlines would unilaterally reduce/meter their flight schedule and divert flight operations/passengers to other surrounding airports until normal operations at CVG could be re-established. This decision would likely start with local airline operations management performing an assessment of exactly what systems, equipment and personnel resources are available, and just exactly what could be run from the airport. They would communicate this assessment back to their airline headquarters operations personnel, and a decision would be made regarding what could safely be in operation. Likewise, KCAB (likely with FAA concurrence, depending upon the issue) would need to notify the airlines if it believes it cannot support current levels of operations, and the airlines would then need to reroute and/or cancel flights. In the aftermath of a significant disaster, the airport may only be able to handle a designated percentage of current scheduled flight activity on a daily basis.

In addition to the detail discussed in this plan, the Facilities Maintenance Department and its maintenance contractors provides the current maintenance of the Terminal, Concourses A and B, and the AGT tunnel. Facilities Maintenance is involved with the following:

 Building maintenance activities like painting, plumbing, HVAC, and loading bridge maintenance

- Electrical maintenance activities like electrical power supply, backup electrical power, electrical and fiber maintenance
- Security cameras and Matrix card access system
- Passenger conveyance equipment (elevators, escalators, moving walkways)

Many Facility Maintenance services may be required during recovery of the Terminal/Concourse operations, or contractors may be used, based upon the level of damage incurred. Depending upon the disaster scope, Housekeeping or contracted bio-hazard services may also be required for any needed clean up in the Terminal or Concourses, if the facility can be re-established within a relatively short period of time. All of these demands will strain available KCAB resources, and likely will require 24 hour labor coverage during the recovery period. Separate business continuity plans also exist for regarding Parking and Ground Transportation operations, and regular Housekeeping operations within the Terminal and Concourses. In addition, KCAB staff from Administrative departments would be assigned, as needed, to assist in recovery or alternative processing activities.

#### **Federal Agencies**

Air travel capability can be significantly affected by the actions of at least the following federal agencies:

- Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
- Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
- Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
- Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
- Department of Agriculture

Each of these organizations plays some role in the ability of the airport to operate and for air operations to occur. Customer Service has reached out to the TSA and CBP for any information they can share on their specific plans, including available replacement equipment and personnel; baggage screening; passport and quarantine plans; and the ability to perform tasks in a "manual" mode.

#### **Vital Records**

No specific KCAB vital records

#### Trained Back Up Individuals

Vice President – Customer Service (currently Brian Cobb) absence – COO (currently Tim Zeis) or Senior Manager – Terminal Operations, depending upon the item.

Senior Manager-Terminal Operations (Stephen Saunders) – Vice President – Customer Service Senior Manager-Customer Relations (Wendi Orlando – Vice President – Customer Service

All KCAB management maintain a listing of all employee names and contact numbers offsite at their homes. If an individual would need to contact someone at home and the list was not available and the number was not stored in their phone, they would call the Airport Communications Center which would provide the information from their official list of employee contact numbers.

### **Recovery Plans by Process/Function**

Customer Service, along with Planning and Development; Information Technology; Security, Security and Compliance; and Facilities Management, play key roles in any business recovery efforts involving Terminal and flight operations. Planning and Development maintains CAD drawings and engineering records for the buildings. Facilities Maintenance retains operating

certificates for escalators and elevators. Both would need to work with regulators to ensure the airport is cleared to safely operate regarding passenger health and safety. The TSA, CBP, and the FAA, may also have significant input and involvement depending upon the situation and the location of any damaged facilities. Following would be the list of initial key responsibilities in the recovery effort:

- 1. The first goal would be emergency and incident containment providing for and maintaining public safety and security. ARFF and Airport Police would have principal responsibility in this area, and the Vice President-Customer Service would monitor and assist with the management of the activity, as needed. This work would be in the nature of first responder actions. Depending upon the nature and location of the incident, the Security Checkpoint may be closed to secure the sterile concourse. The Airport Security Coordinator (Dave Cameron), Police Chief (Scott Schwarz), and the TSA could be significantly involved in these decisions, depending upon the situation.
- 2. Once the initial problem is addressed, perform an assessment of damage to facilities. This would be a collaborative effort of the Planning and Development, Information Technology, Facilities Maintenance, Customer Service, ARFF, and any other necessary departments and vendors/consultants used by Planning and Development in this effort, as well as the various KCAB maintenance sections, and ARFF and Airport Police as needed for security and safety reviews. The TSA and Airport Security Coordinator may play significant assessment roles, depending upon the nature and location of the damage, structural integrity of the facility, whether key building systems (utilities, HVAC, fire suppression) are operational, the need to reroute passenger flow, etc. This work could involve physically securing areas from access by the public, rerouting public activity, maintaining public safety and security during these efforts, assessing any environmental hazards and mitigating them, and beginning some level of cleanup of the facility. Depending upon the locations affected, airline representative will be involved in the evaluation process to ensure replacement equipment, staffing, and network operations are reestablished.
- 3. Based upon the evaluation in step 2, determine the impact upon ability of KCAB to function for flight operations, including the ability of passengers to arrive and depart at the airport, availability of passenger screening, ticketing, loading/unloading, and baggage operations. Upon making the necessary evaluation and decision, communicate the information as necessary to airlines, TSA, FAA and other KCAB departments. Airlines will use this information to determine their immediate service plans, and any changes in levels of service.
- 4. Begin work with Planning and Development, consultants, Finance, and Risk Management (insurance claim requirements) to implement any necessary business continuity plans for facilities and areas affected, and to begin to plan for the future.

For any of these steps, KCAB may activate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) as a central command center to manage the issues that will arise until a return to normal operations begins.

The Infrastructure Business Continuity Plan discusses backup electric, water and sewage, telephone and data service provision to the Airport. The concepts and plans discussed in that document also apply in ensuring these utility services are in place in this area during a recovery period.

#### **General Alternative Facility Planning**

For any of the alternative processes or control processing procedures being considered, it is important that the amount of passenger throughput per hour using that alternative is estimated. This throughput may be significantly lower than usual due to the reduced size of areas assigned for processing. In these cases the throughput becomes critical in determining how many passengers can be processed hourly. This information would be passed along to the airlines to enable them to determine what level of flights could be reasonably processed in a reduced flight schedule.

Another consideration involves electric service-if a facility did not have commercial electrical service from Duke Energy and had to rely upon in-place electric generators, there would only be limited service supplied for critical needs. Emergency lighting, some security cameras and matrix systems would be operational. Other key items like conveyance equipment, loading bridges, flush toilets, and similar key items would not be operational. Restoration of commercial service would be a key need.

If either the East or West Ticketing area was unavailable due to the effect of a partial disaster where the other side was functional, and the Security Screening and all subsequently located facilities like the Concourses were operational, the airlines would be required to share the available passenger check-in positions and bag induction facilities. There would be some 'start up' time required to enable each airline to establish their specific customer systems at these relocated positions. The individual airline ticketing, reservation and check in systems are proprietary to that company; KCAB is only providing a LAN connection for their operation. In order to operate the ticketing position a LAN connection is normally needed; however, in an emergency situation the airline could probably use cellular aircards for the necessary internet connection. KCAB Information Technology could also run temporary connections between the equipment and any newly installed switches in wiring closets in the Ticketing area. Preplacement of such connections for future use should also be considered on a proactive basis.

If Ticketing could not be performed on the current Ticketing area, it could possibly move to the Baggage Claim level. There would be more limited space there and it and would not provide a good customer experience. Temporary equipment could be set up as discussed above, with queuing for lines established using available equipment that is on hand. Each airline has a baggage office on this level and in that office is an airline computer that could also be used to check in passengers. Due to limitations this also would not be an ideal alternative, but could be used as a short term solution. As another option, this process could be established at the Delta Hangar or FIS areas.

If Concourse A <u>or</u> Concourse B were partially unavailable for operation, but the remaining portion of the facility was deemed safe for occupancy, had available and sufficient environmental systems (HVAC, power, restrooms) and gate and boarding/unboarding capabilities, KCAB would need to work with each airline regarding a sharing of available facilities, given the anticipated reduction in flights proposed by airlines in response to the incident. If one (but not both) of the Concourses was unavailable, KCAB and the airlines would again need to develop a plan where any unused gates are activated, and then all available gates are utilized by all airlines (again assuming a reduced overall flight schedule) until the incident is resolved and the Concourses are again fully usable. It is anticipated there would be some disagreement among the airlines regarding any sharing of facilities which may require resolution. More discussion of this topic follows later in this document.

If the Terminal (including security screening and/or Concourse A or B) is unavailable for use by airlines and passengers, the most likely available alternative is to use the FIS location in Concourse B for the passenger check-in and baggage drop off and pick up functions. Specifics are discussed in pages 8-10 of the following plan, but some key elements are also discussed below. One large issue with using the FIS for passenger operations is this is a physically small area, so crowding (as well as possible fire code issues) could pose problems. Elevator, escalator and door access systems would need to be modified to ensure security is maintained, requiring assistance by Facilities Maintenance. A general plan for alternative Terminal operation would be:

- a. Assuming the Terminal entrance is not available, as well as normal access from the parking garage and passenger delivery from shuttle buses from the long term parking lot, taxis, or rental car shuttle buses, a plan will need to be quickly developed where all these passenger transportation sources are directed for subsequent passenger accumulation. Depending upon the incident scope, this could possibly be under-utlized lots (e.g. former DHL / north area, ValuPark long-term lot, Employee Lot, Cell Lot and surrounding area) or non-Airport controlled locations (e.g. hotel, parking, or large-logistics sites). KCAB would need to immediately negotiate access and use rights if the location is not on Airport-owned property.
- b. Arrangements would then be needed for passenger delivery to the FIS area from this accumulation area. KCAB owns two buses capable of transporting passengers around the airfield service roads. (If needed for transport from local, off-airport hotels, lots or alternative sites, Airport Police would work with Transportation Cabinet and local law enforcement for some type of temporary waiver.) KCAB drivers with bus-endorsed CDLs would need to operate these buses. Temporary bus service could also be negotiated with other local mass-transit operators (e.g. TANK, Cincinnati Metro, etc.) or could possibly be provided by KCAB-contracted buses operating to/from ValuPark long-term parking lot and Employee lot. KCAB individuals with escort badge capabilities likely would need to ride with each bus, depending upon the driver, their security clearances and knowledge of airport traffic, the bus source, the destination, and any TSA requirements. These KCAB escort personnel would be recruited from available KCAB personnel, with the ID Department providing a list of employees with escort access. Customer Service and Procurement would handle the communication of the need and establishment of this service with the bus company.
- c. The Airport Police, Planning and Development, and Maintenance would need to work with Procurement to obtain and place temporary security perimeter fencing and provide access points through that fencing to and from the FIS from public roadways for passenger accumulation from shuttle buses, parking facilities, taxis, and ground transportation operators. This includes designating pick up and drop off areas and traffic flow. Procurement would be needed to place an immediate order to suppliers for this material.
- d. Airport Police, PSA, and other local law enforcement operating under Mutual Aid agreements would be needed to be stationed on a 24/7 basis at strategic locations as well as any access points in the fence to ensure appropriate physical security is maintained. If Mutual Aid is used, a system to track personnel and equipment would be needed.
- e. External Affairs/Public Information Officer would need to communicate through various media sources (television, radio) and CVGairport.com specifically where individuals with flights should arrive, passenger accumulation points for transfer to the FIS, extra time considerations, etc. They also need to communicate that any 'meet and greet' activities may be limited, and alternative sites may also need to be determined for this activity.

- f. The TSA would need to establish screening facilities, obtaining and /or moving screening equipment and associated items. The Airport Security Coordinator would need to work closely with the TSA to obtain their concurrence regarding the proposed facility physical layout and security plan. The TSA would need to obtain, place and test/validate the necessary passenger and baggage screening equipment (that is a TSA responsibility, although KCAB would need to work with them regarding the physical location, available power, communication lines and IT infrastructure). It is possible that portable battery-powered wands or even manual luggage inspection or pat-downs could be temporarily used, depending upon the capabilities and the approval of the TSA. Manual inspection of customer bags by TSA may be initially required. Once screened, these personnel would physically load the baggage onto the carts to be moved to and loaded on the plane. Paper-based bag tickets and boarding passes may need to be used if the airline bag handling or check-in systems were inoperable.
- g. Regarding the actual FIS location, passenger delivery would occur by bus from the central accumulation point to the current arriving FIS gate locations. Inside this area, the airlines having current operations would establish temporary check in facilities. KCAB would need to provide/procure temporary desks for airline operations, equipped with electricity, scales, and access to internet connections for connection of airline systems. Cincinnati Bell, Information Technology and Facilities Maintenance would need to establish the internet capabilities. This may involve using certain existing capabilities, providing for new equipment if needed, and possibly the use of wireless technology.
- h. LAN access for airlines to use their customer reservation, check in/boarding pass, etc. systems may be an issue for a period of time, so Wi-Fi or another temporary wireless service provision by Cincinnati Bell would be used. Airlines would need to have the necessary staff on hand to operate in a much more "manual" paper-based mode, as well as a stock of supplies such as manual boarding passes and tags for luggage processing. The availability of such items for the airlines is unknown. Airlines would need to provide labor and carts for luggage accumulation and delivery to operating components of the baggage system.
- i. TSA security screening, which is discussed earlier, would then be located behind these temporary check in facilities. It is anticipated that temporary walls, barriers, and structures will be needed to be constructed in order to provide for traffic flow as well as security concerns. A number of badged KCAB personnel will be temporarily reassigned to provide for directional assistance and answering questions, and the Sign Shop will need to provide some temporary wayfinding. Other continuity plans discussed later in this document for MUFIDS, paging, etc. would need to be implemented. Until MUFIDS service was active, temporary, handwritten signs and designated airline/KCAB personnel would be drafted to direct arriving passengers to the FIS area where their bags had been sorted by arriving flight number, or provide the gate information, directions, and similar information to departing and arriving passengers. If only temporary (less than a month) FIS use was anticipated, certain passenger activities could possibly be handled directly at the Concourse gates. Microphone capabilities in place would be used.
- j. Baggage from arriving flights would be unloaded and transported to designated carousels in the FIS for passenger pickup. This plan requires further construction of walls and barriers as necessitated by security needs to separate unscreened passengers. If international flights were still operational, agricultural and customs locations in FIS would still need to be utilized. If this location does not prove feasible for possible bag pickup, the Delta Hanger could be used, but a shuttle bus service would be needed to transport passengers to and from the facility.
- k. Departing passengers would use the B12 gate exit to leave the FIS and head to Concourse A or B.

- I. Arriving passengers in Concourses A and B would be directed to the FIS (or possibly Delta Hanger) for bag pickup. Passengers without checked bags would be picked up by contracted buses at each concourse and transported out the temporary security fence to the original point of accumulation, where shuttle buses would then transport them to the parking lot or garage.
- m. Portable restroom facilities may need to be added in several of these areas to cover increased passenger flow. Temporary concessions using carts could be used for food and beverage delivery, but this may not be possible due to space limitations.

As mentioned previously, the airlines will look towards the airport for available physical facilities, assess their technical, operational and personnel situation, and then determine the plan for going forward.

## Following are the plans for specific situations that may occur, as opposed to general loss of a facility:

### 1. Security Screening Operations (Recovery Priority Assignment - #1)

Principal Functions Involved with this Process:

Description:	Frequency:
Ability of TSA, through the use of both personnel and equipment, to perform physical identification verification and screening of passengers and airport employees prior to their entry into the sterile area.  Another consideration involves the screening of	Performed daily, and the time sensitivity involves the need to move individuals through security lines as quickly, efficiently and effectively as
arriving international passengers, to the extent international operations would continue in a reduced service situation.	necessary

Recovery Plan - This activity and recovery plan (equipment, equipment certification, and personnel staffing) are the responsibility of the TSA or other federal agency as required; however, KCAB will be responsible for ensuring appropriate HVAC, LAN and electrical service are provided, as well as possible physical rearrangement or placement of barricades, gates, signage, and similar physical needs. The Airport Security Coordinator, Customer Service, and Facilities Management supervisory personnel would be the key KCAB representatives coordinating the meeting of federal agency requirements in these areas. If the Security Screening Operation must be relocated due to a physical disaster, it is believed the TSA likely has internal contingency plans and requirements for such situations, but KCAB has never inquired or received a TSA plan regarding such events or any significant reductions in available TSA personnel. Any available and undamaged screening equipment could be relocated from the Security Screening Building and repositioned if passenger operations are relocated to the FIS area. Equipment could also possibly be obtained relatively quickly by the TSA from their nationwide inventory, or possibly scheduled shipments of equipment to other airports would be diverted to CVG. It is assumed some TSA testing/verification/certification may be needed before the equipment can be used. Hand-wanding could possibly be used, if approved by the TSA. If the current Terminal location can still be used but electric service is disrupted, there is no generator service available, but Planning and Development indicates the area was designed to allow for the placement of external generators for temporary electric power.

If the international arrivals area only was affected, ramp level deplaning and then clearing at the Terminal Security Building using Concourse A or B quarantine procedures and mobile screening units performed by CBP. Needs would involve queuing capability, screening positions, and passenger detention and baggage quarantine areas. Another possible option involves ramp level deplaning and clearing at the Terminal Security Screening area using available space.

### 2. Customer Physical Arrival and Departure (Recovery Priority Assignment - #1)

Principal Functions Involved with this Process

Description:	Frequency:
Passenger loading and drop off, arrivals and	Performed daily during all times
departures occur at either upper or lower levels at the	of customer operations
Terminal. Signs clearly mark the traffic flow and	·
passenger areas.	

Recovery Plan – In the event of physical damage to either level at the Terminal entrance ramps, roadway, or the building entrance (but the building itself was still operable), vehicle and foot traffic would need to be rerouted. The rerouting for a specific situation would be determined after the situation was reviewed by Airport Police and Planning and Development to determine appropriate and safe passenger and vehicle rerouting needed. If needed the Police can place their mobile directional sign for traffic control, and additional PSAs assigned for traffic control. Other signage may be placed by the Sign Shop, and AM radio announcement may need to be updated for traffic control instructions. Revised public address announcements may be used for passenger information. (IT should consider pre-recording certain messages so they can just be 'plugged in'. Non-essential KCAB employees may be assigned to traffic control. In a critical situation curbside check-in may need to be ended, but skycap service could continue if possible.

If both the ramp and roadway / entrance areas were unavailable but airline operations could otherwise continue (example-upper level vehicle ramp collapses), these departments would need to determine an available staging area for passengers to accumulate for pickup and drop off, as well as coordinating parking access and activities. This would need to include consideration of whether the parking garage itself was operational, and if it could still be accessed from the Terminal. Depending upon the issue, valet operations may need to be relocated from the upper ramp, or at least suspended during the event. KCAB may then need to procure bus service to move the garage passengers from a garage staging area to an available entrance door at the Terminal, depending upon the location of the staging area and passenger pick up. Another option would be to use the back side of the Terminal or the Ground Transportation Center as a temporary passenger entrance. A specific decision would be made at the time of the disaster, based upon the facilities that were available. Signage and Police/PSA traffic assistance would be needed, as these decisions would generate significant traffic congestion.

KCAB owns two buses to transport passengers these buses (which are unlicensed and can only be used on airport property) could be used for temporary airport service. KCAB drivers with bus-endorsed CDLs would need to operate these buses. Temporary bus service could also be obtained from TANK or Cincinnati Metro. KCAB individuals with escort badge capabilities or PSAs may need to ride with each bus, depending upon the driver, bus source, destination and TSA requirements. Customer Service and Procurement would

handle the communication of the need and establishment of service with the bus company. The airlines would be responsible for handling any plans for reestablishing skycap service, and Parking and Ground Transportation would work with the cab, valet and limo companies regarding any necessary relocation or limitation of their services.

If the main public road to the Airport (Ky. Route 212) was closed, or the 4B interexchange interexchange from I-275 damaged, the Airport would need to route traffic directly from Donaldson Road, or from the Donaldson Road exit on I-75. If I-75 or the Brent Spence Bridge were closed, traffic from Ohio would be re-routed by Ohio/Kentucky state officials via I-275 to the airport. The Donaldson Road (I-75) or Mineola Pike (I-275) interchanges provide alternative interstate access to the Airport.

If any roadway outage is expected to last less than two hours, there would be no specific procedures utilized for passenger notificatication. External Affairs would tweet the information, and an Airport Policeman may be needed to coordinate resulting traffic. If the work will affect traveling public for more than two hours, External Affairs will work with Customer Service for communication of additional information. Customer Service, Maintenance, or Airport police will work with Kentucky District 6 in order to have signage placed notifying drivers of the issue. An AM radio communication announcement may also be made, and tenant notifications may be made through Everbridge. The Sign Shop may be needed to prepare and place temporary directional signage at the I-275 interchange or on Donaldson Road, large electronic signs could be rented for directional guidance, and Airport Police to provide traffic assistance. External Affairs would work with local media to ensure the notification of this traffic rerouting is fully communicated to the public in all media outlets, and interstate signage assistance may also be needed to be provided by the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet.

### 3. Loss of Use of AGT Tunnel (Recovery Priority Assignment - #1)

Principal Functions Involved with this Process

Description:	Frequency:
The Automated Guideway Tunnel (AGT) provides underground transit from the Terminal to Concourses A and B through two automated trains. Operation and maintenance of the train system is the responsibility of a Delta maintenance subcontractor. There are also a walkway and moving sidewalks (in each direction) running parallel to the trains. Maintenance of these walkways and moving sidewalks is the responsibility of KCAB. The moving sidewalks are maintained under a	Frequency: Performed daily during all times of customer operations
contract with a third party – currently Kone. This is the only passage access between the Terminal and the	
Concourses.	

**Recovery Plan -** In the event of physical damage to the tunnel which prevents its use (but Concourses A and B are safe, secure and can still be operated), passenger traffic normally using the tunnel would need to be rerouted. Loss of the conveyance equipment (elevators and escalators) to and from the underground AGT would render it useless as methods are needed to move passengers from the tunnel to elevated sections of the Terminal, Concourse A or Concourse B. A separate conveyance failure contingency plan has been

developed - see Section 9 of this document for a discussion of that plan. If airline operations can otherwise continue, KCAB would need to bus passengers from the Terminal to the Concourses. The passengers would need to be picked up post-Security (bottom of Security Screening Building, at the door leading to ramp area) and transported by bus to the Concourses – Airport Police or other authorized personnel would be needed to ensure security and traffic safety is maintained. Again, temporary bus service could be obtained from two owned buses acquired from Comair, TANK or Cincinnati Metro. Bus drivers having SIDA driving clearance would need to be identified. Until such bus drivers could be badged, badged KCAB employees with escort capability could ride on the bus in an escort capacity. The buses need to be initially physically inspected for security purposes. Any TSA requirements for bus inspections established at the time of the initiation of this plan would also need to be enforced.

If the trains were inoperable but the walkway was open, passengers would need to walk or use the moving walkway between the Terminal and Concourses. Additional Skycap / passenger assistance services would need to be obtained to ensure any passengers with physical issues can be delivered to their destination. Additional golf carts could be immediately rented, and Skycaps or other means of transportation would need to be arranged for passengers with special needs. KCAB Procurement would need to be contacted, but there would be a potential issue with badging of temporary employees. In a worst case, badged KCAB employees may need to assist. Any damage repair to the moving walkway would be coordinated by Facility Maintenance with Kone, the contractor used for moving walkway repair services. Additional Ambassadors or badged KCAB employees drafted to assist could help direct passengers as needed.

## 4. Loss of Multi User Flight Information Display System (MUFIDS) and / or Local Area Network (LAN) (Recovery Priority Assignment - #1)

Principal Functions Involved with this Process

Description:	Frequency:
The Multi User Flight information Display System (MUFIDS) utilized in Concourse A and the Terminal includes several subsystems that support and enhance passenger and airline information services, including check-in, boarding and baggage areas. MUFIDS includes the following subsystems:  • Flight Information Display System (FIDS)	Performed continuously
Gate Information Display System (GIDS)	
Bag Information Display System (BIDS)	
Visual Paging Information System (VP)	
Tugman Devices (Concourse A airlines)	
MUFIDS involves a physical internet connection from the terminal devices operated by the airlines at the gates or check-in areas to the KCAB LAN, and then in/out to a ComNet physical connection in Dayton Ohio. From there, the connection is made to the originating airline from which the information is generated. This airline information includes flight	

number, connecting city, arrival/departure time, baggage claim detail, etc.

The Local Area Network (LAN) provides the communication and distribution network throughout the terminal and concourse via the structured cabling system, including backbone cabling and horizontal cabling. Given the distance between the various elements of the MUFIDS system and the performance limitations of the cabling, several rooms with network equipment are located throughout the Terminal and Concourse A. The rooms include a single Main Distribution Frame (MDF) room, several Intermediate Frame (IDF) Distribution rooms and multiple communications (COMM) rooms.

Tugman devices connect to the MUFIDS system and are located next to the bag belts. They are used in flight/bag routing associations and involve selecting the applicable flight number from a screen to list the information, but are not critical as BIDS are essentially the same process.

KCAB provides airline computers for Delta and all other airline back office operations (i.e., not reservation or check in system computers). These back office computers are used for MUFIDS access in the event the airline feed is lost-they would be used to reenter the airline master schedule.

Recovery Plan - If the MUFIDs system and process or the LAN were inoperable but operations were continuing at the Terminal and Concourses A and B, Information Technology will be immediately contacted, and they will coordinate necessary software, hardware or data connection repairs with the LAN support vendor (Pomeroy) or the MUFIDS support vendor (ComNet). This may involve procuring replacement equipment, or working with Facilities Maintenance and outside contractors to restore fiber lines and LAN operation. Information Technology personnel could run wiring from wiring cabinets to replacement computers or digital boards if simple relocation of equipment was needed. The necessary work would be dictated by the nature of the disaster. During an outage period where the airlines were still operating, the airlines would need to establish internal connections (or possibly even dedicated telephone communication with their reservation and flight information feed sources. The use of any available wireless/WiFi/cellular aircard services are the method for this communication. Temporary access would be coordinated with internet service providers to provide this access. If airline feeds could not be obtained from them, Flightview is an alternative vendor service for obtaining the information. Baggage claim location information could also be communicated by internal phone calls from individuals involved with the baggage process. The information would need to then be communicated to the public through a manual process like recording the information on white boards or easels at various locations in the Terminal and Concourse to communicate gate or baggage claim information. It would need to be determined who would be responsible for this activity (Airport or each carrier), and the necessary tools and personnel

to maintain the information accuracy would need to be obtained. White boards would also be used as an alternative for visual paging, including at two visual paging locations at the Concourse B Food Court. KCAB Procurement would need to work with Dell or similar vendors to provide for the immediate replacement of the back office computers.

### 5. Terminal and Concourse Paging (Recovery Priority Assignment - #2)

Principal Functions Involved with this Process

Description:	Frequency:
Gate specific voice pages are performed by the individual airlines and terminal-wide or concourse-wide guest/passenger voice pages are performed by the	Performed continuously
KCAB ACC. Voice paging and announcements in the gate area by staff members of the airline will be broadcast within a specific zone based on the gate location associated with the page.	
In addition to the audio/voice paging system, the Terminal and Concourses A and B are equipped with a visual paging system. The visual paging messages are displayed on designated MUFIDS monitors within the public areas of the Terminal and Concourse A. All visual paging requests are directed to the ACC.	

**Recovery Plan** – See prior section for discussion of visual paging alternative process. If audio paging was inoperable, KCAB would rent portable microphone/ speakers and place at strategic locations as a temporary alternative.

### 6. Baggage System (Recovery Priority Assignment - #1)

Principal Functions Involved with this Process

Description:	Frequency:
The baggage system transports baggage to and from	Performed daily during all times
the Terminal to Concourses A and B. Maintenance of	of customer operations
the system is the responsibility of Delta, and KCAB	
owns the system. The baggage system consists of the	
conveyor system, baggage carousels, induction belts,	
Explosive Detection System (EDS) machines, flight	
information input devices, and various system control	
devices. The primary interaction points for Concourse	
A carriers are the Ticketing Level Induction Belts, Bag	
Claim Devices and T-Drive in the Terminal building,	
Concourse A Bag Make Up and "GB8" at Conc. B.	

**Recovery Plan** - Airlines may retrieve luggage from multiple locations depending on the location of the system failure. If the system failure is located between Concourse B and Concourse A, luggage may be retrieved at GB8 located between gate B11 and B13 on the south side of Concourse B. In the event of a system failure between A and B, luggage may be inducted into the system using the standard induction belts on the opposite end of the

Ticketing Level at the Terminal. For example if the belts on the west end fail, airlines using the west end ticket counters may induct baggage on the belts located on the east side of the ticketing level. Similarly, if the oversize belt fails on either end, the airline may utilize the oversize belt at the opposite ticketing counter. In the event the system fails between Concourse A or Concourse B and the Terminal, inbound luggage will be brought to the T-Drive via Tug for induction. Available tugs could be used from planes to a final pickup destination; in addition, departing passengers could be limited to only carry on luggage in a worst case scenario (which would not be 'customer-friendly').

### 7. Passenger Boarding Bridges (Recovery Priority Assignment - #1)

Principal Functions Involved with this Process

Description:	Frequency:
Passenger boarding bridges are comprised of	Performed daily during all times
mechanical and electrical components, hydraulics,	of customer operations
fixed tunnels and other components including 400	
Hertz, 28.5V DC ground power unit, preconditioned air,	
and potable water. It excludes the physical gatehouse	
structure and the electrical feed and power to the	
passenger boarding bridge equipment. Each bridge is	
capable of simultaneous omni directional movement	
including vertical elevation, rotation in a horizontal	
plane in addition to extension and retraction capability.	
Power cables are also part of the passenger boarding	
bridge consideration.	

Recovery Plan - When necessary due to equipment failure or other uncontrollable circumstance, KCAB will enplane or deplane passengers via an aircraft's air stairs or by mobile passenger stairs. Several mobile passenger stairs are owned by KCAB and available, and they would be shared among the operating carriers. Procurement and Customer Service would identify additional sources of passenger stairs or similar equipment if needed. Delta would provide its own equipment. Passengers will be required to walk across an area of the ramp to/from the Concourse, so it is imperative that utmost attention be given to ensuring the safety and security of those passengers. This may include special attention during periods of inclement weather, such as additional snow and ice treatment. Passengers are not generally aware of the potential dangers that surround them in this type of loading/unloading situation, and it is, KCAB responsibility to ensure their safety and security. Ensuring such safety would be accomplished by mobilizing KCAB employees who have ramp access privileges and knowledge of ramp security and safety procedures for assistance, as well as temporary barrier placement. Initially, Police and ARFF would likely be requested to provide this immediate assistance. In the event of a power loss, these bridges are not powered by generators.

### 8. Airplane Fueling (Recovery Priority Assignment - #1)

Principal Functions Involved with this Process:

Description:	Frequency:
A hydrant fueling system is used for fueling of all	Performed daily during all times
aircraft at Concourse A and B with the exception of	of customer operations

aircraft parked at gate A18. Fueling from tanker truck	
is permitted for aircraft parked at Gate A18.	

Recovery Plan - In the event of system failure, fueling by tanker truck would be permitted by the Chief Operating Officer or his designee. The Vice President-Commercial Management will contact ASIG, the fueling supplier providing service at the airport, to provide these services. Although the hydrant fueling system is operated by Delta, any calls to request servicing or to report problems should be made through the Airport Communications Center at 859-767-7777. ASIG handled tanker fueling until the Terminal 2 closing in May 2012, and is therefore familiar with the process and safety requirements. KCAB will coordinate hydrant service requests with Delta's contracted maintenance provider. Any repair of the fuel lines would be coordinated through Delta. See additional write up regarding the fuel farm operation.

### 9. Extended Failure of Conveyance Equipment (Recovery Priority Assignment - #1)

Principal Functions Involved with this Process:

Description:	Frequency:
Various elevators and escalators are used in passenger movement, as the Terminal, Concourses, and AGT all involve different elevations. Additionally, a series of moving walkways in the Tunnel and Concourses provides non-walking transportation across large areas. These devices are all serviced under contract by Kone Inc.	Performed daily during all times

**Recovery Plan** – KCAB has developed a detailed plan for the scenarios involving loss of this equipment. The plan is documented and is attached as Attachment A to this plan.

#### 10. Gate Constraints

Principal Functions Involved with this Process:

Description:			Frequency:	
Providing seating, ticket collection, restroom and Performed daily during all time		Performed daily during all times		
similar functions at temporary gates			of customer operations	

**Recovery Plan-** Additional passenger seats would be recovered from damaged areas of the Terminal and Concourses, cleaned, and reused. Temporary restroom facilities may need to be established. Military rooms may need to be temporarily repurposed. Temporary signage may be needed to be created for passenger wayfinding.

### Critical Applications/Systems Required/Recovery Plans-

Legal or Regulatory Considerations: KCAB has filed an Extended Tarmac Plan, and plan compliance must be a consideration. Compliance with OSHA, FDA, EPA, and Kentucky Department of Health considerations, as well as any other pertinent health and safety requirements, would be required during these operations, especially with regard to passenger operations.

Key Forms Required: None by KCAB to airlines. The ID Department indicates TSA receives from them a report of all terminations, new hires, and security threat assessments. ID sends them a report of all active Matrix badges on the 7<sup>th</sup> of each month. ID sends a report to CBP of all KCAB employees with customs holograms quarterly, and a report of all terminated employees with holograms as the termination occurs. Customs has a one-way interface to the Matrix system that sends down badge information for card holders with customs access to their Matrix system. In their Matrix system they assign access rights within their area.

Contractual Obligations: The ability of KCAB to provide facility services to airlines operating at the Airport under use agreements must be a contractual consideration.

Confidentiality Level/Requirements: None

Emergency Communication Plan: Communications are provided by the following methods:

1. <u>800 megahertz radios</u>. The computer based 800 megahertz radio system is used for mobile local communication purposes. This is the primary internal communication source used by Safety, Security and Compliance for internal communication to employees in the operations departments. Further information on the system can be found in the ARFF and Airport Police Business Continuity Plans. <u>Incident Recovery Plan</u> - The backup capabilities of these radios are provided by the UPS battery backup and the switchover to generator power if necessary. Repeaters and servers are physically separated (Concourses A and B), but in an incident of significant scope this may not provide significant redundant service. If the radio system becomes inoperable in an incident, primary backup communication service is provided by the cellular phone system and the employee list of contact numbers. In a worst case situation where the cellular system fails, personal cell phones (using alternative carriers) could be used to communicate. Not all Customer Services personnel currently are assigned radios; excess radios from the Housekeeping Department would be assigned to these individuals.

### 2. Company Provided Mobile Communication Devices

All key personnel are issued company-provided Verizon mobile communication devices. See the Infrastructure section for a discussion of Verizon's continuity plan. Personal cell phones could also be used if necessary.

3. <u>Landline Telephone Service</u>. If landline telephone service is lost, the immediate backup would be to utilize cell phone service.

#### **Key Recovery Partners**

The following partners, business associates, service companies, etc. may need to be notified of a disaster and subsequent recovery plans and personnel location to ensure continuation of critical services.

Company Name	Service Provided	Contact Name, Address, and Telephone Number
United Airlines	Services under contract to Simplicity USA	859-525-5930 (Operations)
American Airlines	Services under contract to Envoy Air	859-767-3751 (Operations)
Frontier Airlines	Services under contract to Trego Dugan	859-767-5544 (Trego-Dugan Operations)

Allogiont Airlings	Services under contract	050 767 5544 (Trage Dugen Operations)
Allegiant Airlines	to Trego Dugan	859-767-5544 (Trego-Dugan Operations)
Delta Airlines	Passenger Airline	859-767-5199 (Delta Ramp Tower)
DHL	Cargo Airline	859-817-8003 (DHL Ramp Tower)
Air Canada	Services under contract	859-767-5544 (Trego Dugan Operations)
All Gallada	to Trego Dugan	1 003-707-3344 (Trego Dugari Operations)
Federal Express	Cargo Airline	859-393-9779 (Bob Broderick, manager)
OneJet	Passenger Airline	859-803-5400 (Julie Landrum, manager)
Transportation Security	Federal Government	Ray Williams Ray.Williams@tsa.dhs.gov
Administration	Security	859-488-0282
ComNet	MUFIDS Maintenance	Help Desk 888-488-2030 x1
		Project Manager-Joe Sullivan 937-859-6323
		x228 jsullivan@comnetsoftware.com
		Mgr Customer Service - Ben Kinser 937-859-
		6323 x153 bkinser@comnetsoftware.com
ASIG	Airline Fueling	Mile Cappadona
	3	Mike.cappadona@asig.com
		859-767-3148
Cincinnati Bell	Communication/WIFI	Network Operations Center 513-397-7999
	wireless service	Escalation: John Miller 513-345-2296
		Paul McDaniel 513-835-0012
		Mike Waggonner 513-390-7346
		Credit Card Issues 513-566-4369
Pomeroy	LAN Operations	Acct Rep – Ron Borgatti 800-846-2727 ext.
-	Maintenance	4149 ronborgatti@pomeroy.com
		Director-Bill Tappy 800-846-2727 ext 1245
		wtappy@pomeroy.com
Cisco	I AN Operations	200 552 2447
Cisco	LAN Operations- Equipment Support	800-553-2447
Kentucky Highway	Kentucky Highway	Nancy Wood 859) 341-2700
District 6	Management	Namey Wood 659) 541-2766
Emerge	LAN Operations	Project Mgr - Lillian Kipling 859-538-3129
Lineige	LAN Operations	Ikipling@emergeits.com
		System Engineer – Joe Frank 859-538-3121
		ifrank@emergeits.com
Flightstats	Aircraft feed information	jiranik @ omorgono.com
	provided to Comnet,	
	which uses the	
	information for MUFIDS	
Trego Dugan	Gate and ramp services	859-767-5544 Operations
5g5	on contract basis to	CCC 101 CC 11 Operations
	airlines	
CNN	CNN Monitors	Pat Flanigan 770-329-4775
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

### Conveyance Plan Attachment A

Following is the conveyance contingency plan developed in 2014 through the efforts of several departments, and coordinated by the Vice President – Customer Service.

#### General

- PD: Place Speed Indicator along Commercial Lane approaching (TSA Parking) access point
- Facilities: gate install at TSA parking between T2 and Main Terminal
- Radios for busses; A and B line frequencies
- Consideration for electric carts
  - o 1 in B
  - o 3 in AGT

### At Terminal (minimum of 6 staffers)

- Departures (security escalators operational)
  - West escalators barricaded
  - WCHR/disabled only on elevators
  - o 2<sup>nd</sup> level East escalators barricaded
  - o Agent at top of East escalators metering
  - Agent stationed at 2<sup>nd</sup> level to direct straight ahead into stations
  - o Agent at designated A door
  - o Agent at designated B door
- AGT
  - Agent at AGT level escalators exit to confirm direction/guidance
  - o Arriving FIS customers to exit normally and use stairwell and elevator
- Arrivals
  - o North side of GTC for Concourse A Arrivals
  - o South side of GTC for Concourse B Arrivals
  - Agent at GTC throat to offer guidance
- Signage
  - Wall wrap in GTC with RED Baggage Claim / Ground Transportation w/ arrow
  - Double-sided Large RED Baggage Claim / Ground Transportation w/ left-right arrow into stairwell
  - Single-sided Large RED Baggage Claim / Ground Transportation w/ left arrow into stairwell
  - WCHR/disabled
    - Double-sided Large Green Elevator w/ left-right arrows to main elevator at center
      - (use lean, rest, relax pictograms)

### At A (no escalators) (minimum of 5 staffers)

- A1 for Arrivals
  - o Interior door shunted
  - Agent at Atrium to segregate customers; elevator for disabled, T1 for able-bodied

- Agent at top of stairwell to meter if necessary
- o Agent at bottom of stairwell (exterior) to monitor security and bus capacity
- A4 for Departures
  - Switchback positioned at bridge
  - Agent at Bridge (exterior)
  - Agent at A4 (interior)
- Signage
  - Arrivals
    - Barricaded Escalators at Atrium and A4
    - RED Baggage Claim / Ground Transportation w/ right arrow into T1 holdroom
      - No WCHR/Crutches/Cane ACCESS (use lean, rest, relax pictograms)
    - RED Baggage Claim / Ground Transportation w/ down arrow into T1 stairwell
    - Cover overhead signage at Atrium
  - Departures
    - BLUE To All A Gates w/ up arrow at A4 adjacent to escalators at A4
    - BLUE To All A Gates w/ left arrow between CNBC and Starbucks

### At B (no escalators) (minimum of 8 staffers)

- B12 for Arrivals
  - o Interior door shunted
  - Switchback positioned at bridge
  - Agent at B12 main hall entrance to segregate customers; B12 for able-bodied, redirect to elevator for disabled
  - Agent in holdroom to meter passengers into bridge
  - o Agent at bottom of bridge to monitor security and bus capacity
- B14 for Departures
  - Switchback positioned at bridge
  - Agent at Bridge (exterior)
  - Agent at B14 (interior)
  - o Agent at B14 main hall entrance
- General
  - Main escalators, B12 escalator, B14 escalators barricaded
  - o B12 Stairwell open for access FROM FIS one way traffic
  - Agent near Info counter to segregate able-bodied and wheelchair/disabled towards elevator
  - Agent at elevator to segregate or redirect
- Signage
  - Arrivals
    - Double-sided Large RED Baggage Claim / Ground Transportation w/ leftright arrow into B12 holdroom
      - No

WCHR/Crutches/Cane ACCESS (use lean, rest, relax pictograms)

- RED Baggage Claim / Ground Transportation w/ down arrow into B12 bridge
- Departures
  - BLUE To All A Gates w/ up arrow at B14 gate area
  - BLUE To All A Gates w/ up arrow near B14 main hall entrance
- o WCHR/disabled
  - Double-sided Large Green Elevator w/ left-right arrows to main elevator at center
    - (use lean, rest, relax pictograms)
- o FIS
- RED Baggage Claim / Ground Transportation w/ left arrow onto B12 stairs
- Single-sided Large Green Elevator w/ up arrow to main elevator
  - (use lean, rest, relax pictograms)
- IF ESCALATORS WORKING
  - Allow FIS traffic down to AGT and exit through Terminal exit lan stairwell or elevator

### **CHECKLIST FOR IMMEDIATE RECOVERY ACTIONS – TERMINAL OPERATIONS**

Following are key activities to be immediately performed to begin the recovery process for Terminal Operations.

Action Item	Completed by	Date & Time
Action rem	<u> </u>	Date & Time
Complete emergency response and incident containment.		
2. After incident containment and area is safe, perform assessment of		
damage to facility.		
Assessment performed by appropriate KCAB department		
personnel, assisted as needed by consultants.		
<ul> <li>Planning and Development to provide construction and design</li> </ul>		
records as needed.		
3. Assessment should include consideration of available:		
Electric service		
Water		
Sewer		
Fiber network		
Life safety and monitoring (Honeywell)		
Cell phone service		
Key items to operate ticket counters		
4. Finalize KCAB assessment of impact upon ability to function safely		
for flight operations. Communicate results with Senior KCAB		
Management. Include estimated time to place each back in service.		
5. Communicate assessment results via conference call to airlines for		
their review and comment upon what must be done. Airlines may		
wish to perform their own assessment.		
6. Come to agreement with all airlines regarding the level of service		
KCAB can provide the particular airlines.		
7. Airlines to provide their own replacement ticketing and other		
necessary equipment, based upon service to be provided.		
8. Review Business Continuity Plans and use them to create specific		
procedures to be followed.		
9. Notify the following of decisions regarding relocation and new		
procedures during recovery period		
Everbridge page to pertinent KCAB employees		
<ul> <li>TSA Operations Center (859-488-0866)</li> </ul>		
• FAA ATC (859-372-6450)		
Public communication by External Affairs (AM Radio,		
television and commercial radio, internet, twitter, Facebook,		
etc.)		
10. Relocate facilities and equipment to alternative processing		
locations discussed in detailed Business Continuity Plan, using all		
available and needed KCAB employees.		

Access roads to airport	
Terminal	
Ticketing	
Security Screening	
• AGT	
Conveyance	
Concourses A and B	
11. Specific items to consider for recovery include:	
Passenger transportation to alternative location	
Maintaining minimum security	
a. Construction of fences, barriers, walls, other physical	
access control	
b. Police, Security, PSAs	
c. Meeting at least minimum security requirements of TSA	
and Customs and Border Protection	
Maintaining life safety monitoring-use of fire watches if	
Honeywell system is not operational	
Communication methods to inform passengers of relocated	
facilities – AM radio messages, paging, signage, use of	
additional Ambassadors and / or KCAB administrative	
employees	
At least minimal passenger conveniences (restrooms, limited	
concessions	